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An individual manipulability of positional voting rules
(Springer Heidelberg, 2011-12) Sanver, Mehmet Remzi; Aleskerov, Fuad; Karabekyan, Daniel; Yakuba, Vyacheslav
We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.
Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity
(ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, 2017-11) Nunez, Matias; Sanver, Mehmet Remzi
We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules. Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would suggest. Our analysis is made both under variable and fixed-size electorates. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
The basic approval voting game
(SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN, 2010) Sanver, Mehmet Remzi
ABSTRACT: We survey results about Approval Voting obtained within the standard framework of game theory. Restricting the set of strategies to undominated and sincere ballots does not help to predict Approval Voting outcomes, which is also the case under strategic equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium and its usual reÖnements. Strong Nash equilibrium in general does not exist but predicts the election of a Condorcet winner when one exists.