An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

dc.WoS.categoriesEconomicsen_US
dc.contributor.authorSanver, Mehmet Remzi
dc.contributor.authorAleskerov, Fuad
dc.contributor.authorKarabekyan, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorYakuba, Vyacheslav
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-18T09:04:09Z
dc.date.available2021-01-18T09:04:09Z
dc.date.issued2011-12
dc.description.abstractWe study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.en_US
dc.fullTextLevelFull Texten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s13209-011-0050-yen_US
dc.identifier.issn1869-4187
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-82055193325en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/3122
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0050-y
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000297543800002en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.issue4en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.nationalInternationalen_US
dc.numberofauthors4en_US
dc.pages431-446en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Heidelbergen_US
dc.relation.ispartofSeries-journal of the spanish economic associationen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectManipulabilityen_US
dc.subjectPositional voting rulesen_US
dc.subjectMultiple choiceen_US
dc.subjectExtended preferencesen_US
dc.titleAn individual manipulability of positional voting rulesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.volume2en_US

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