One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness

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dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.contributor.authorZwicker, William S.
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:25Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:25Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractSuppose that a vote consists of a linear ranking of alternatives, and that in a certain profile some single pivotal voter v is able to change the outcome of an election from s alone to t alone, by changing her vote from P-v to P'(v). A voting rule F is two-way monotonic if such an effect is only possible when v moves to from below s (according to P-v) to above s (according to P'(v)). One-way monotonicity is the strictly weaker requirement forbidding this effect when v makes the opposite switch, by moving s from below t to above t. Two-way monotonicity is very strong-equivalent over any domain to strategy proofness. One-way monotonicity holds for all sensible voting rules, a broad class including the scoring rules, but no Condorcet extension for four or more alternatives is one-way monotonic. These monotonicities have interpretations in terms of strategy-proofness. For a one-way monotonic rule F, each manipulation is paired with a positive response, in which F offers the pivotal voter a strictly better result when she votes sincerely.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipScientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) [107K560]; Turkish Academy of Sciences, Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP); Spanish Ministry of Education and Science [SAB 2004-0264]en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipM. Remzi Sanver's work is part of project #107K560, supported by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK). He also acknowledge the support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences, Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP). William S. Zwicker gratefully acknowledges support from Grant SAB 2004-0264 of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science. Some of the work was done while he was visiting the Department Fundamentos del Analisis Economico at the University of Alicante and the Economics Department at the University of Caen. We thank Steven J Brams, Francois Maniquet, Eric Maskin, Herve Moulin, Maurice Salles, Alan D Taylor, William Thomson, and John Weymark for helpful comments and conversations. Both the editor and an anonymous referee made a number of suggestions for additional references and improvements in the text.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9
dc.identifier.endpage574en_US
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276
dc.identifier.issn1432-1270
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-77349086143en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage553en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7107
dc.identifier.volume38en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000272029900007en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Heidelbergen_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Game Theoryen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectOne-Way Monotonicityen_US
dc.subjectMonotonicityen_US
dc.subjectParticipationen_US
dc.subjectNo-Show Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectStrategy-Proofnessen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectScoring Ruleen_US
dc.subjectSensible Virtueen_US
dc.subjectCondorcet Extensionen_US
dc.subjectSocial Choice Functionsen_US
dc.subjectNo-Show Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectManipulatabilityen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectPreferencesen_US
dc.subjectRulesen_US
dc.titleOne-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
dc.typeArticle

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