A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
dc.authorid | Ozyurt, Selcuk/0000-0002-3326-5238; | |
dc.authorwosid | Ozyurt, Selcuk/AAF-8431-2020 | |
dc.authorwosid | Sanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019 | |
dc.contributor.author | Ozyurt, Selcuk | |
dc.contributor.author | Sanver, M. Remzi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-18T20:42:43Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-07-18T20:42:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.department | İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | A social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D-lambda of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D-lambda. As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D-lambda while social choice correspondences are particular social choice hyperfunctions, we are able to generalize many impossibility results in the literature. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 892 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1090-2473 | |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-67349157013 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.startpage | 880 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7376 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 66 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000267605300032 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wosquality | Q2 | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Web of Science | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Scopus | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | en_US |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Strategy-Proofness | en_US |
dc.subject | Manipulation | en_US |
dc.subject | Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem | en_US |
dc.subject | Social Choice Correspondences | en_US |
dc.subject | Hyperfunctions | en_US |
dc.subject | Manipulation | en_US |
dc.subject | Correspondences | en_US |
dc.title | A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions | |
dc.type | Article |